September 18, 2008

Heritage’s Parliament Members Attend the European Economic Forum

Krynica Zdroj, Poland—Heritage Party’s parliamentarians Stepan Safarian, Larisa Alaverdian and Anahit Bakhshian took part, from September 10 to 12, in the 18th Economic Forum. The event, which was organized by the Eastern Institute of Poland and held in the Polish town of Krynica Zdroj, is also known as the Davos of Eastern European countries, or simply as Little Davos.

On September 10, Larisa Alaverdian delivered a report—and responded to the inquiries made—during the discussion, entitled “Values Which Unite Us,” which was held by the discussion panel on Science and Culture. Alaverdian noted that the Armenians considered themselves as part of the European heritage and identity and deemed necessary the protection of these values by the European body politic and without the exercising of double standards. “In my view, the foremost danger is the imitation of reforms and the international community’s approval of those ‘reforms.’ The employing of double standards imperils young democracies as well as European values and society,” Alaverdian concluded.

On September 12, the three members of Heritage’s parliamentary faction simultaneously addressed in three different discussion panels. Chairwoman Anahit Bakhshian of the Heritage Party’s executive board spoke during the debate, entitled “European Union-Russia: A General Social and Cultural Measurement?,” which was held by the discussion panel on Society. Assessing the present-day social and cultural situation in Europe, Bakhshian stated in particular: “Humanity is achieving great progress in the domains of information technology and satellite system and is engineering incredible machinery. But it seems the civilizational advancement and scientific progress are directly proportional to the loss of moral values and this, in my view, is a result of the existing emergency in the Christian system of morals.” Bakhshian also added that politics wished to reunify the political boundaries of nations and in result ethnic conflicts emerged which, according to Bakhshian, are tried to be resolved by means of confrontations instead of Christian principles. “In my deep conviction, and as my lifelong pedagogical experience has taught me, these principles can be brought to bear solely through education,” Bakhshian maintained.

Larisa Alaverdian took the floor during the roundtable entitled “Transformation of the Post-Soviet Expanse: The Role of Russia,” which was convened by the discussion panel on Regions and devoted to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. In her intervention, Alaverdian stated that events that occurred this August have proved yet again that all issues of concern to the superpowers and the small nations, alike, can be resolved through pacific means alone. She also emphasized that in the case of the small nations in the Caucasus, the term “national minority”—in its classical sense—is inapplicable firstly because these nations are the natives of the area in which they live and also since their right for self-determination was honored during Soviet times. “In the juridical and institutional sense, the national and statal structure of the USSR was anchored in the precept of equality among all peoples. All USSR subjects, irrespective of their status, enjoyed the same guarantees for sovereignty,” Alaverdian noted, also adding that the USSR’s law on the procedures for resolving matters in regard to a Soviet republic’s secession from the USSR had set out clear and unequivocal rules to carry out that secession. In particular, Article 3 of this law referred to those Soviet republics which had several autonomous territories and peoples inside their boundaries. According to Alaverdian, the Russian Federation—which became a member in the United Nations—became the USSR’s legal successor and therefore also assumed the role of the guarantor for the security of small nations which had found themselves within the borders of former Soviet republics. “The cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are especially of note because after seceding from the USSR, Georgia declared itself a unitary state and, by not honoring the people’s right for self determination and the obligation to resolve conflicts pacifically, it basically turned its back on international law and in fact violated it,” Alaverdian maintained, but also indicating that this was the sole common aspect between those conflicts and the Karabagh conflict. She concluded by stating that the fall of the USSR resulted in the emergence of mini empires which aspire to play the role of the big brother to those nations that are endowed with the very same equal rights and, for this reason, these nations seek the newly formed state-like units of separation.

Secretary Stepan Safarian of the Heritage’s parliamentary group delivered his report during the deliberation, entitled “European Union-South Caucasus: Long-Term Directions for Economic Cooperation,” which was organized by the discussion panel on European Union and Its Neighbours. In his account, Safarian reflected on the newly emerged risks as well as the already existing risks which now have become even more alarming in light of the economic cooperation in the region and with respect to the EU-South Caucasus cooperation, in general. He divided these risks into three distinct groups. As indicated by Safarian, the first group is the growing risk of a resumption of war and the latest events in South Ossetia are its vivid illustration. “For many years the international community, and specifically Europe, has turned a blind eye to the fact that the profits received from the regional economic projects openly are being used to increase military expenditures, and nothing is being done to prevent the arms race,” Safarian argued. According to him, the second group of risks includes: a) incapacity of the political leadership and the democratic and statal institutes to resolve domestic and regional matters through pacific and democratic avenues and by way of discourse and talks; b) boundaries of leadership by the ruling political electorate; and, c) absence of legitimacy. “And under such conditions the shady domestic and foreign dealings become inevitable. It is therefore sufficient to merely observe the frequency in which the European bodies have discussed—and will continue to discuss—the issues of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,” Safarian added. He called the third group of risks the “failure of neighborhood.” In his view, even though the EU has declared a considerable part of the post-Soviet area as its neighborhood zone and expects good relations with—and neighborly relations among—the countries in the region, the reality has attested to the “good neighbor-bad neighbor” relation. In one case, Armenia was deemed a bad neighbor and excluded from regional projects and, in another case, Russia was considered the same and plainly was bypassed. And, as maintained by Safarian, this is also why Russia now conducts a confrontational policy in the Caucasus and, following the well known recent events, it likewise plays that game and says: “The world needs to make a decision: either a good partner of Russia, or of the bad neighbor—and virtual plan—Georgia.” In the words of Safarian, however, Armenia does not wish to face such a dilemma because it wishes to lose neither its strategic partner—Russia—nor its non-strategic neighbor—Georgia—nor the extremely important power centers—the United States and European Union. And as a way out of this predicament, Stepan Safarian proposed the reduction, or elimination, of the above-mentioned risks. This proposal comprises: 1) Stopping of the arms race and signing of agreements which rule out the use or threat of force; 2) Instead of approving the imitation of democratic reforms, encouraging real and substantive reforms in the three recognized and unrecognized, or semi-recognized, countries; applying of the same standards in all matters and everywhere; and, 3) Changing of the rules of the game being played out in the region and starting of regional projects which will include all the countries in the region; not postponing of EU-Russia talks but rather mutual defining of the rules; and lessening of regional uncertainty.